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IS HEALTH INSURANCE A BAD IDEA? 
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost1 
 
Unique among the developed nations of the world, the United States 
depends on private insurance to insure a majority of its residents.2  Private 
insurance exists virtually everywhere in the world, but in most countries it 
merely supplements or complements a comprehensive public insurance 
program that covers all, or virtually all, of the population.3  There are 
complicated historical, political, and cultural reasons why we depend on 
private insurance for health coverage in the United States.4  It seems very 
unlikely, however, that we will abandon private health insurance as our 
primary form of health coverage in the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear, that private insurance coverage in the 
United States is on the decline.  Employment-based insurance coverage 
probably peaked sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and has been 
falling ever since, with a brief uptick in the late 1990s.  Coverage has 
dropped from 73 percent of the population under 65 in 1999 to 66.5 percent 
in 2006.5  Even though public insurance coverage has been growing as 
private insurance coverage shrinks, the number of uninsured continues to 
rise, to 43.6 to 44.8 million, nearly 17% of the under-65 population in 
2005-2006.6 
                                                                                                                 
1. Robert F. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University., This article 
was submitted in August of 2007, and was current as of that date.  It is based in part on my 
recently published book: TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF 
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 54-69 (2007). I would like to thank the Frances Lewis 
Law Center and the Willett Family for research support.  
2. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?  National Health 
Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 433 (2004) (describing how other nations 
provide health care coverage). 
3. ELIAS MOSSIALOS & SARAH M.S. THOMPSON, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, FUNDING HEALTH CARE: OPTIONS FOR EUROPE 128-31 (Elias 
Mossialos et al. eds., 2002) 
4. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1. 
5. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS UNDER 
AGE 65 YEARS WITH PUBLIC HEALTH PLAN COVERAGE AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE, BY AGE GROUP: UNITED STATES, 1997-2006 (2007), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200706_01.pdf. 
6. The lower figure is from: CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AT THE TIME 
OF INTERVIEW, BY AGE GROUP: UNITED STATES, 1997-2006 (2007), 
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Although most view the number of uninsured as a problem, a small, but 
very influential minority of American policy advocates consider 
“overinsurance” to be our most serious policy problem.7  The strength of 
this movement,   known euphemistically as the consumer-driven health 
care (CDHC) movement, is demonstrated by the fact that these advocates 
succeeded in the waning moments of the 109th Congress, in expanding 
federal tax subsidies for health savings accounts (HSAs), their policy 
alternative to conventional health insurance.8 
Since the early 1970s, a number of conservative and libertarian 
advocacy groups have kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism of our current 
private health insurance system.9  They claim that this system is the product 
of bad public policy, in particular of the employment-related health 
insurance tax subsidy.10  This subsidy, they charge, has resulted in 
employers offering and employees accepting far more insurance than 
would be purchased without the tax subsidy.11  
This excessive insurance, they claim, results in excess consumption 
and higher prices of health care.  The tax subsidy decreases the price to 
consumers and thus increases the demand for health insurance, which in 
turn decreases the price to consumers and increases the demand for health 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200706_01.pdf. The higher figure is from: 
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Revises 2004 and 2005 Health 
Insurance Coverage Estimates (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/health_care_insurance/009789.html. 
7. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION: 
WHAT’S HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 46-58 (2005); JOHN C. 
GOODMAN, GERALD L. MUSGRAVE & DEVON M. HERRICK, LIVES AT RISK: SINGLE-PAYER 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2004); JOST, supra note 1, at 35. 
8. Health Savings Accounts were created by the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066 
(2003), and codified at I.R.C. § 223 (2007).  Contribution limits were liberalized by the 
Health Opportunity Patient Empowerment Act of 2006 in the last minutes of the 109th 
Congress; see Press Release, United States Treasury, President Bush Signs Bill to Make 
Health Care More Affordable, Accessible (Dec. 20, 2006), available at  
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp209.htm. 
9. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK,  supra note 1, at 70-85. 
10. See JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, 
WEALTHY, AND WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 15-16, 27-33 (2005); 
CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 61-66; JOHN C. GOODMAN, GERLAD L. MUSGRAVE & 
DEVON M. HERRICK, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS, 50-51 
(1992). 
11. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 62-65. 
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care.12  Insured health care consumers buy far more health care products 
and services than they would if they had to pay for health care out of their 
own pockets.  This is the phenomenon of moral hazard that insurance 
teachers talk about every day.  Consumers also pay higher prices than they 
would pay without insurance because they have no incentive to shop 
around for lower price providers.13  The tax subsidy is, therefore, one of the 
most important reasons why health care costs so much in the United 
States14  While the moral hazard claims of CDHC advocates seem to be 
solidly based in neoclassical economic theory, they also are supported by 
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which found that insureds with 
higher deductible plans do in fact consume less health care.15 
But there is more to their claims.  CDHC advocates also argue that 
consumers who are not paying for health care out of their own pockets are 
less concerned about quality than they might be if they were paying for 
services themselves.16  At least, consumers have less reason to seek out 
comparative information regarding providers, which could support 
shopping based on quality as well as cost.17   Fully insured individuals also 
have less incentive to take care of themselves, to engage in healthy 
behaviors and seek preventive or early primary care, and thus are more 
likely to become ill and need health care18 (a claim, by the way, that the 
Rand study found no evidence to support).19 
The ultimate solution to the problem of excess insurance–simply 
outlawing health insurance–is not embraced by even the most fervent 
market advocates.   They understand the problem of catastrophic costs – of 
the highly skewed nature of health care costs that accounts for health 
insurance in the first place.20  Few people can afford to pay out of pocket 
for a heart transplant or for the services required to respond to the major 
                                                                                                                 
12. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 62-63; COGAN, HUBBARD & KESSLER, supra 
note 10, at 29-30. 
13. JOST, supra note 1, at 19. 
14. See supra note 10. 
15. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL?  LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993); see JOST, supra note 1, at 120-28 (examining the findings 
of and critiquing the RAND HIE). 
16. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 54-57. 
17. Id. 
18. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 92-94. 
19. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15 at 200-01, 208. 
20. See Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?, supra note 2, at 436. 
380 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2 
 
traumatic injuries caused by a car accident.21  Many of those afflicted with 
expensive chronic diseases would soon find themselves unable to afford 
further health care without health insurance. Bankruptcy solves the 
problems of some of those faced with enormous expenses and no 
insurance, but it only deals with already incurred costs and does not assure 
continuing access to care.22  Bankruptcy, moreover, only shifts the costs of 
care to providers, who themselves may be financially unable to absorb the 
loss. 
Acknowledging the problems that would attend the elimination of 
health insurance, CDHC advocates rather call for limiting insurance to truly 
catastrophic expenses through the imposition of high deductibles.23  Most, 
but not all, CDHC advocates also call for the creation of health savings 
accounts (HSAs) to be coupled with high-deductible health insurance plans 
(HDHPs).24  They call for tax subsidies to cover contributions to the HSAs 
(whether contributions come from employers or employees) as well as the 
income from those plans and payments for high-deductible health plans.25  
Advocates contend that HSAs will introduce point-of-purchase competition 
into health care and save the cost of claims processing, thus reducing health 
care costs.26  At the same time, they believe that HSAs will assure that 
consumers have funds available to purchase health care, thus assuring 
access, and will encourage consumers to shop for better quality products 
and services, thus improving quality.  They even argue that moving to 
CDHC will expand insurance coverage, as catastrophic policies will be 
more affordable, both because they offer thinner coverage and because 
consumers will consume more cost consciously, bringing down insurance 
costs.27 
Over the past half decade the CDHC movement has been 
extraordinarily successful in public policy advocacy.  Although tax 
subsidies for medical savings accounts were first introduced by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, they were subject to 
                                                                                                                 
21. According to recent estimates, heart transplants cost from $50,000 to $287,000, 
averaging $148,000, while liver transplants cost from $66,000 to $367,000, averaging 
$235,000.  Transplant, CHFPATIENTS.COM, http://www.chfpatients.com/tx/transplant.htm. 
22. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor Patient: In Search of Non-Debt Based 
Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 456-57, 462 (2003-2004). 
23. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 231-32. 
24. Id., CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 66-68. 
25. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 7, at 67; Cogan, Hubbard, & Kessler, supra note 
10, at 35-38. 
26. GOODMAN et al., supra note 10, at 249-250. 
27. Id. at 250. 
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many restrictions and never really caught on.28  The Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), however, greatly expanded tax 
subsidies for health care accounts, which it rechristened health savings 
accounts, or HSAs.29   
The MMA offers a tax exclusion to employers and a deduction to 
employees for funds contributed by an employer or employee to an HSA.  
The HSA must, however, be coupled with a HDHP, which must, in 2007, 
have a deductible of at least $1100 a year for a single individual or $2200 a 
year for family coverage.30  The catastrophic policies that accompany an 
HSA must also have caps on out of pocket expenditures, which cannot 
exceed $5500 for an individual and $11,000 for a family in 2007.31  The tax 
subsidies for contributions to the HSA for 2007 only extend to 
contributions up to, for 2007, $2850 for individual coverage and $5650 for 
family coverage.32 Under the MMA, tax-deductible contributions were also 
limited to the amount of the deductible, but this limit was removed by 
Congress in legislation late in 2006.33  
Money contributed to an HSA can be spent for “qualified medical 
expenses,” without being subject to income tax, but withdrawals are subject 
to both income tax and to a 10% excise tax if it is spent for other 
purposes.34  “Qualified medical expenses” are broadly defined to include 
many things not covered by traditional health insurance, such as 
nonprescription drugs.  HSA expenditures are controlled only by very 
                                                                                                                 
28. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 301, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996).  Too few people signed up for the HIPAA 
demonstration project to allow program evaluation.  General Accounting Office, Medical 
Savings Accounts: Results form Surveys of Insurers, 1 (1998). 
29. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, § 1201, and codified as amended at I.R.C. § 223.   For a careful 
examination of these provisions, see Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal 
Responsibility?  Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 548-56 (2005). 
30. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) & (II) (2000).  See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts, 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml.  
The insurer may, however, cover preventive medical expenses, such as screenings or 
vaccinations, before the deductible is met. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(C), I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 
2004-15 I.R.B. 725. 
31. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) & (II) (2000).  See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts, 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml 
32. I.R.C. § 223(b) (2000).  See also 2007 HSA Indexed Amounts, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml.  
33. H.R. 6408, § 303, 110th Cong. (2007). 
34. I.R.C. § 223(f) (2000).  
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infrequent audits by IRS auditors who have no health care expertise35.  It is 
likely, therefore, that HSA expenditures will be limited only by the 
imagination, on the one hand, and good faith, on the other, of their owners.   
If HSA funds are not spent for health care, they can be withdrawn for 
any purpose once the account holder dies, becomes disabled, or reaches the 
age of 65.36  HSA funds may continue to be withdrawn after age 65 for 
qualified medical expenses, including Medicare premiums, free from 
taxation.37  If they are used for other purposes after age 65, withdrawals are 
taxed as income, but no penalties attach.  
The HSA has been joined by another new health savings device, the 
health reimbursement account or HRA.  The HRA was created not by a 
statute but rather by the IRS.  In 2002, the IRS determined that existing 
legislation authorized the offer of tax subsidies for employer contributions 
to health savings vehicles fully funded by employers.38  The HRA is 
attractive to employers because the accounts can be held as notional 
accounts and need not be fully funded and because the funds in them also 
need not go with the employee if he or she leaves employment. 
HSAs and HRAs have grown quite quickly over the past two years, 
although the number enrolled in these plans, like everything else about 
them, is contested.  The Employee Benefits Research Institute estimates 
that about 1.3 million Americans are enrolled in a consumer-driven plan, 
though another 8.5 million Americans have a plan with a deductible high 
enough that they could set up an HSA.39  The Center for Health Systems 
change estimates that about 1.43 million Americans have an employment-
based HSA and 1.3 million have an HRA.40  AHIP, the health insurance 
trade association, claims that 4.5 million Americans are in HSA-compatible 
                                                                                                                 
35. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2) (2000).  Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-38 I.R.B. 559; I.R.S. Notice 
2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269. 
36. I.R.C. § 223(f)(4) (2000). 
37. I.R.C. §§ 223(d)(2)(C)(iv), (f)(1) (2000). 
38. Rev. Rul. 2002-41. 
39. Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund 
Consumerism in Health Care Survey, Employee Benefit Research Center, Issue Brief No. 
300, December, 2006. 
40. Jon Gabel, Jeremy Pickreign, & Heidi Whitmore, Behind the Slow Growth of 
Employer-Based Consumer-Directed Health Plans, Center for Studying Health System 
Change, Issue Brief No. 107, December 2006, available at 
http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/900/900.pdf. 
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plans.41  CDHC advocates claim that the number of Americans in 
consumer-driven plans will grow to 15-30 million over the next 5 to 10 
years,42 but CDHC growth, rapid in the first two years, seems to have 
leveled off, at least in the employment-related market.43 
There has been a great deal of speculation as to how CDHC will affect 
health care in general and the health insurance market in particular.44   
Advocates believe, of course, that it will bring down costs while improving 
quality and access. Skeptics have worried that CDHC will lead to favorable 
selection, as healthy individuals and families choose consumer driven 
plans, leaving those with costly medical problems in comprehensive plans, 
which will become ever more costly as they cover a smaller and more 
                                                                                                                 
41. AHIP.org, January 2007 Census Shows 4.5 Million People Covered by 
HSA/High-Deductible Health Plans, Ctr. for Policy and Research, April 2, 2007, available 
at http://www.ahipresearch.org/PDFs/FINAL%20AHIP_HSAReport.pdf. 
42. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Dramatic Growth of Health Savings 
Accounts, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/fact-sheet-dramatic-
growth.pdf (14 million by 2010); Health Savings Account Enrollees Predicted to Rise to 30 
Million by 2009, BUSINESS WIRE, May 10, 2007, available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/services/business-services/4342771-1.html. 
43. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 6. 
44.  Much of this speculation is found in the large and growing law review literature 
on consumer-driven health care and HSAs.  For a sampling of the law review literature 
examining the policy implications of consumer-driven health care, see generally Marshall 
Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care:  Informed Consent 
and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2007); W. Eugene Basanta, 
Consumer-Driven Health Care:  Legal and Policy Implications, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (2007); 
Arnold J. Rosoff, Consumer-Driven Health Care:  Questions, Cautions, and an 
Inconvenient Truth, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 11 (2007); Michele Melden, Guarding Against the 
High Risk of High Deductible Health Plans:  A Proposal for Regulatory Protections, 18 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 403 (2006);  David Pratt, Healthy, Wealthy, and Dead:  Health 
Savings Accounts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 7 (2006);  Amy Monahan, The Promise and Peril 
of  Ownership Society Health Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006);  John V. Jacobi, 
Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 531 (2005); 
and Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
485 (2004).  See also, exploring more closely the implications of consumer-driven health 
care for the legal relationships of patients and health care professionals and providers, Mark 
A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008); Peter D. Jacobson and Michael R. Tunick, Consumer-Directed 
Health Care and the Courts:  Let The Buyer (And Seller) Beware, 26(3) HEALTH AFF., 
May/June 2007 at 704; Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay 
For:  Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 
(2006); and E. Haavi Morreim, High –Deductible Health Plans:  New Twists on Old 
Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2006).    
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expensive population, the familiar insurance death spiral.45. Skeptics also 
wonder whether consumers have the information, or perhaps even the 
ability, to make wise consumer choices in health care.46  The Rand HIE, for 
example, found that although insureds with higher deductibles did consume 
less health care, they cut back on high value health care to the same extent 
they cut back on low value health care.47 
Empirical evidence as to how CDHC is working out remains sketchy.   
It seems to be working out very well for banks.  HSAs are the kind of low 
interest savings accounts that used to be the bread and butter of banks but 
that have been hard to market in recent years because they are bad financial 
investments.  The HSA market is worth billions to banks, not just because 
banks pay low interest on these deposits, but also because they collect fees 
for establishing the accounts and for transactions.48  HSAs are also seem to 
be working out quite well for insurance companies that specialize in these 
accounts, several of which have bought or partnered with banks, and some 
of which are managing the accounts themselves.49   Finally, HSAs are 
working out very well for wealthy individuals looking for a retirement tax 
shelter.  Individuals in high tax brackets who have the choice of doing so 
are well advised to buy a eligible high deductible policy, cover any medical 
expenses from the deductible, and invest the legal maximum in the HSA, 
leaving it there for retirement to accumulate tax-free returns.  This strategy 
could allow, by one scenario, a tax-free accumulation of $1.5 million by 
retirement over a 40 year period.50   
It is less clear how CDHC  is working out for employers, who purchase 
much of the private health insurance in the U.S., and for providers.  High 
deductible policies are obviously somewhat less expensive than 
comprehensive policies, but if employers make a significant contribution to 
their employees’ HSAs, they do not necessarily pay less overall.51  Some 
                                                                                                                 
45. JOST, supra note 1, at 133-134. 
46. Id. at 137. 
47. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 162. 
48. James G. Knight, What HSAs Mean for Banks, AMERICAN BANKER, April 29, 
2005, available at 
http://americanbanker.com/article.html?id=20050428X7JY10TC&queryid=630711033&hit
num=2; Eric Dash, Health Savings Promise a Windfall for U.S. Banks, REDORBIT NEWS, 
Jan. 29, 2006, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=373206. 
49. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 23. 
50. Id. at 22. 
51. Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Educational Trust, Employer 
Health Benefits, 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, at 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/. 
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providers welcome the possibility of being able to bill consumers directly 
rather than to deal with insurers, but in fact most consumer-driven policies 
are structured so that the provider bills the insurer in any event, and the 
insurer then collects from the HSA.52  This assures consumers access to the 
insurer’s bargaining power, but means that there is little savings in 
transaction costs.  To the extent that providers bill consumers directly, they 
will experience savings in transactions costs and probably be able to charge 
higher prices, but they also have more risk exposure if consumers are 
unable to pay the bill. 
The most important question, however, is how does consumer-driven 
health care affect consumers?   First, there is some evidence of favorable 
selection toward consumer-driven plans, which seem to be chosen by those 
in better health, but the effect is not clear.53  Because high deductible and 
high coinsurance plans have become quite common in recent years, even 
before the MMA, CDHC plans might be quite attractive to people with 
high medical costs because the law at least requires a cap on out-of-pocket 
limits. There is more evidence that CDHC plans are chosen by wealthier 
and better educated subscribers, which is not surprising.54  
There is also some evidence that CDHC reduces health care spending 
and use, and that participants in CDHC plans use more preventive care 
(which can under the law be excluded from deductibles) and comply better 
with prescribed treatment regimes.55  Evidence on cost-savings, however, is 
still weak and confounded by the possibility of favorable selection, while 
evidence of quality improvement is far from conclusive. Some studies, for 
example, find that CDHC members are more likely to delay or forego 
needed medical care or the use of necessary medications.56 
The most troubling emerging evidence is that CDHC is further eroding 
the modest level of health care solidarity that private health insurance has 
brought about in this country.  The public health insurance systems of all 
other developed countries are based, in the end, on the idea of solidarity–
the belief that we are all at risk of disease and injury, that we all need to be 
                                                                                                                 
52. Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-
Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 408 (2005). 
53. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin, et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early 
Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 516, 519, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?ck=nck&andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1
&disp_type=&author1=&fulltext=&pubdate_year=2006&volume=25&firstpage=516. 
54. Id.; JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 139. 
55. JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK,, supra note 1, at 145. 
56. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 26, 29. 
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healthy to be productive members of society, and we ought all to contribute 
to the cost of health care to the extent of our ability to the cost of providing 
health care for all.57  Employment-based health insurance has sustained a 
weak version of solidarity in the United States.  Within employment 
settings, most employees have more or less equal access to health 
insurance, subsidized by the taxpayer, and with costs arguably borne 
somewhat disproportionately by higher income employees.58 
If employers move toward high deductible policies, however, an ever 
greater proportion of the cost of health care is going to be passed directly 
on to employees, particularly sick employees.  Recent research shows that 
the majority of employees in high deductible plans are not offered a choice 
by their employer; they are simply given the high-deductible plan.59    
Thirty percent of employees with CDHC’s moreover, receive no employer 
contribution to an HSA, and over half receive less than $1000 per year.60  
Lower income employees, moreover, often contribute little or nothing 
themselves to an HSA.  27% of individuals in CDHC plans with incomes 
of less than $50,000 a year contribute nothing to their HSA according to 
the EBRI survey.61  Of those who have had HSAs for a year or more, 23 
percent rolled over nothing at the end of the year, 26%, $500 or less.62  
Overall 14% had nothing in their accounts at the time of the survey, 16% 
more $200 or less.63  44% of those who did not open an account said that 
they did not do so because they did not have money to put into the account, 
19% said that the tax benefits were not attractive enough to justify it.64 
Of course, high deductible accounts mean high exposure for those with 
high health care costs, and overwhelming evidence has emerged in recent 
years that consumers with high deductible accounts who lack health 
savings accounts forego necessary health care.  Adults with health 
problems who have deductibles above $500 (and particularly those with 
incomes below $35,000 a year) are much more likely than those with lower 
deductibles to not fill a prescription, not get needed specialist care, to skip a 
                                                                                                                 
57. Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do, supra note 2, at 433-34. 
58. See Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy To Employment-Based Health Insurance and 
the Distribution of Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 89 (2006). 
59. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 14.  The same is true for about 2 in 5 
employees in plans with HSAs/HRAs, Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and 
Educational Trust, supra note 50 at 103. 
60. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51, at 105. 
61. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 39, at 18. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 14. 
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recommended test or follow-up visit, or report having a medical problem 
for which they have not sought medical care.65  Patients with high 
deductibles are also much more likely to have medical bill or medical debt 
problems.66  Nearly half of “underinsured” adults identified by a recent 
survey were contacted by a collection agency in the year prior to the survey 
regarding medical bills, while more than one-third said that they had to 
change their lives dramatically to pay for medical bills.67  
To put it bluntly, whatever else CDHC may accomplish, it seems to be 
bringing us tax subsidized retirement savings for the rich, high deductible 
health plans and financial misery for the poor.  If one believes that health 
insurance is a bad idea, that health insurance must be seriously curtailed to 
bring about consumer choice and efficient markets, this cost in solidarity 
may be acceptable.   
If one believes, however, that insurance is ultimately about solidarity, 
not efficiency, these issues are troubling.  Health insurance obviously 
contributes to solidarity between the sick and the healthy, but can also build 
solidarity between the poor and the wealthy.  Health insurance is also about 
security–knowing that when you need health care you will be able to get it, 
and to get it without missing a rent payment or a car payment.  Efficiency 
is a good thing, of course, and the efficient distribution of health care 
should be encouraged.  But the evidence that CDHC is bringing us 
efficiency is at best equivocal.  The evidence that it is bringing about the 
breakdown of solidarity and threatening security is stronger.  Health 
insurance is, in fact, a good idea, and we must look for ways to achieve 
efficiency while preserving what little risk sharing still exists in this 
country–perhaps even building on it.  But how we can achieve this is 
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68. See JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra note 1, at 189-204 (exploring this topic 
further). 
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